Ergodic theorems and the basis of science by Peterson, Karl
ERGODIC THEOREMS AND THE BASIS OF SCIENCEKARL PETERSENAbstract. New results in ergodic theory show that averages of repeated measure-ments will typically diverge with probability one if there are random errors in themeasurement of time. Since mean-square convergence of the averages is not so sus-ceptible to these anomalies, we are led again to compare the mean and pointwiseergodic theorems and to reconsider eorts to determine properties of a stochasticprocess from the study of a generic sample path. There are also implications formodels of time and the interaction between observer and observable.1. IntroductionContinuing research in ergodic theory brings new heat, light, and shadow to debateon the relationship between mathematical models and physical reality. Much ofscience depends on the existence of limits, in several possible senses, of averages ofsequences of measurements. But if random uctuations are present in measurementsof time, these limits often do not exist. In order to discuss the recent results and theproblems that they raise, we try both to describe them and to state them with someprecision, but for complete detail the original papers should be consulted.2. Mathematics vs. PhysicsThe widely read and discussed essay \The unreasonable eectiveness of mathe-matics in the natural sciences" (Wigner, 1960) raised|already in its title|intriguingquestions about the surprising usefulness of mathematics in modeling and analyzingnatural processes so as to be able to make successful predictions about their behav-ior. Since the admiration that physicists and mathematicians have for each others'achievements does not completely overwhelm all possible skepticism, Wigner's es-say was soon countered|by a physicist lecturing on \The unreasonable eectivenessof physics in leading to good mathematics", and even by a mathematician, JacobT. Schwartz, in his address \The pernicious inuence of mathematics on science"Supported in part by NSF Grant DMS-9203489. The author thanks Klaus Schmidt and MateWierdl for illuminating discussions. 1
2 KARL PETERSEN(Schwartz, 1986). (There is also Halmos' \Applied mathematics is bad mathemat-ics" (Halmos, 1981), but that is really about another question. See also (West, 1990)and the collection containing it.)Schwartz suggests that awareness of hidden complexities may allow an investigatorsafely to use a simple explanation for complex behavior| that is to say, a theory. (Soa theory is something analogous to a simple program that can generate sets of datathat might seem complicated, as in the idea of computational complexity.) But hecomplains that the mathematical formulation of a theory can be deceptive, encour-aging us to suppose there is more to it, in terms of predictive or explanatory power,than there really is. Moreover, characteristic mathematical arguments, which mustbe precise to be convincing, may be useless in forming real-world science: argumentsthat are convincing even if vague are probably superior, since they are more likelyto be stable under changes of hypotheses and particular conditions. Can there bean argument that is convincing but vague? Clearly this depends on the standardone sets in order to be convinced. Is there a \structural stability" for argumentsand theories, so that certain ones might not change their essentials under some kindsof small perturbations? Could truth itself be somehow structurally stable, so thatonce we arrive close enough to real understanding, further discoveries will produceonly renements and not qualitative changes? It is easy to raise such questions, butdicult even to begin to specify a framework in which they might be addressed.Recent developments in ergodic theory and dynamical systems raise more preciseand limited, but still intriguing, questions about the processes of measurement andanalysis|the relationship between the real world and the scientic study of it|andthe relationship between mathematics and the physical ideas it seeks to model.3. AveragesScience begins with observations, when possible quantitative ones, that is to say,measurements. Strangely enough, if a measurement is repeated, usually a dierentvalue is obtained. Thus the scientist makes a sequence of measurements and seeksto analyze the resulting time series, perhaps by looking for repetitions (exact orapproximate) or trends, perhaps by taking averages of the successive measurements.Often the sequence itself might not show any trend, but as averages are taken oflonger and longer blocks of measurements, the averages might; for example, theymight appear to settle down toward a constant limiting value. Perhaps the processof averaging allows one to cancel out, in the limit, the eects of random noise orexperimental error or other irrelevant (additive, mean-zero) factors. (To decide whatis the actual target of observation and what is irrelevant noise may seem to present acircular problem. It can be addressed by, for example, conducting several experimentsthat are identical in many aspects of their design. Eects that seem to persist mayprovisionally be considered real.) If the averages do converge to a limit, this mayreveal some underlying structure in the process under investigation. As an example,
ERGODIC THEOREMS AND THE BASIS OF SCIENCE 3suppose that a coin is ipped repeatedly, and our measurement consists in writingdown a 0 for heads and a 1 for tails on each ip. The sequence of 0's and 1's willin general be quite irregular, but their averages will converge to a number p whichrepresents the probability of getting a 1 on any ip and which carries some informationabout the physical structure of the coin or the nature of the ipping mechanism. Ifthe averages fail to converge, we will question whether the same coin is being usedall the time or whether the process is indeed governed by constant laws.(Note the mistaken discussion in (Schwartz, 1986), where the Ergodic Theorem iscriticized for being deceptive on the basis that it deals with equilibrium situations,so there is no point in taking averages since all observables will have reached theirconstant equilibriumvalues. Of course there are many equilibrium situations in whichinteresting quantities are far from constant, such as the repeated independent ips of acoin above, or (frictionless, conservative) linked pendulums, or a constrained systemof particles making elastic collisions. Even though frictionless cases may not berealizable in practice, they can be extremely well approximated. And the interest inthe convergence of averages persists in many purely mathematical examples, includingones that model physical processes.)A few words about a standard way to model physical systems, deterministic orstochastic, within the same framework, namely that of ergodic theory. Let us denotethe set of all possible states of the system being studied byX. A point x 2 X gives allpossible information about the system; even if the system consists of a huge numberof particles, knowing x will bring with it absolutely perfect knowledge of, for example,the position and momentum of every particle in the system. Such perfect informationis unattainable; instead of knowing the state x exactly, typically we will be able toknow only whether or not x is consistent with some observable event B specied bya certain subset of X, that is, whether or not x 2 B. The collection of all observableevents forms a subfamily B of the family of all subsets of X. B is assumed to be a(nonempty) -algebra|closed under countable unions, countable intersections, andthe taking of complements|so as to permit countably-innite set-theoretic (equiv-alently logical) operations and hence analysis, which depends on taking limits. Theprobability of each observable event is determined by a function  : B ! [0; 1] thatis assumed to be countably additive (([1k=1Bk) = P1k=1 (Bk) if the Bk are pair-wise disjoint) and such that (X) = 1. A measurement on the system, or randomvariable, is a measurable function f : X ! R. (For f to be measurable means thatfor each interval I in the real line R, the event that f takes a value in I, namelyf 1(I) = fx : f(x) 2 Ig, is an observable event, i.e. is a member of B.)Now we get to the dynamics of the system, namely its development in time, pre-sumably on the basis of some sort of xed laws. This is modeled by a measure-preserving transformation T : X ! X. This means that T is a one-to-one ontomap from X to X (possibly after a set of measure 0 has been excised from X)which preserves observability (B 2 B , T 1B 2 B , TB 2 B) and probability
4 KARL PETERSEN((B) = (T 1B) = (TB) for each B 2 B). The idea is that if at any given instantthe system is in state x 2 X, then at the next instant the system is in state Tx.The invariance of  under T|the assumption that probabilities of observable eventsdo not change with time|reects the fact that we are in an equilibrium situation.As mentioned above, this does not at all mean that the system is completely static!Think of several species competing or cooperating on an island when a new speciesis introduced. There can be a period of time when the populations uctuate wildlybefore reaching a new equilibrium situation, which might itself involve uctuations,periodic or even irregular, in the population sizes. This sort of approach toward equi-librium is sometimes represented mathematically as follows: an initial point is chosenaccording to Lebesgue probability measure in the manifold of possibilities availablein the world of the experimenter (supposedly listing the actual real-world values ofrelevant variables, subject to errors in measurement); the trajectory of this point ap-proaches an \attractor" in the manifold, on which the limiting dynamics can be quitecomplicated (but not necessarily|there could be just a single xed point, or peri-odic orbit); and Lebesgue measure itself in time evolves towards a limiting invariantmeasure, supported on the attractor, which describes at least in statistical terms thedynamics of the equilibrium situation for the system being studied. Beginning withdierent initial points will in general lead in the long term to behavior that is quitedierent in its particulars but identical in a qualitative sense, for example in termsof the relative amounts of time that the system spends near any particular state.So far we have treated time as discrete or quantized, proceeding in a sequence ofsuccessive instants. Another popular model involves a continuous time parameter:we suppose that we have a family fTt : t 2 Rg of measure-preserving transformationssuch that T0 is the identity map on X, Ts+t = Ts  Tt for all s; t 2 R, and Ttx is ajointly measurable function of the two variables t and x. We think of Ttx as specifyingthe state at time t of the system if at time 0 it is in state x. This is the model based onthe solution of systems of dierential equations (supposed to encapsulate the physicallaws governing time development), with given initial conditions (supposed to containthe raw data corresponding to the contingencies of a particular physical realization).Although this model was long associated with the culmination of Newtonian mechan-ics in a deterministic \clockwork" view of the universe, we can also use it to modelsystems in which chance, indeterminacy, or hopelessly unanalyzable complexity areinvolved in the essentials.The time development of the system, starting from state x at time 0, is given bythe orbit or trajectory O(x) = fx; Tx; T 2x; : : :g. The scientist seeking to measure anobservable quantity f obtains the sequence of real numbers ff(x); f(Tx); f(T 2x); : : :gand may compute the sequence of averagesAnf(x) = 1n nXk=1 f(T kx) .
ERGODIC THEOREMS AND THE BASIS OF SCIENCE 5The existence of the limit of these averages as n !1 is a question of fundamentalimportance for science: Is it true that for almost every initial state x (that is, withthe possible exception of a set of probability 0) limn!1Anf(x) = f(x) exists? Ifso, f(x) represents a mean or average value of the observable f that can carry someinformation about the underlying structure of the system. If not, (for example, ifthe averages continue to wander aimlessly as n increases), we have to question themeaning of the sequence of measurements or of the model itself.It has been remarked since the beginnings of ergodic theory (von Neumann, 1932)that even an individual measurement (like our above f(x)) that is supposed to beinstantaneous can in fact already be essentially a long-term average of many repeatedmeasurements (like limn!1Anf(x) = f (x)). A needle on a gauge is averaging,through its momentum, the eects of many small inuences that take place on a timescale much more rapid than ours. Now if the limit does not exist with probability1, we cannot even write down a single measurement f(x), and science can't even getstarted! 4. The Ergodic TheoremsThe existence of the limits as n!1 of these averages was proved in 1931 by vonNeumann, for mean convergence, and Birkho, for almost everywhere convergence(see (Petersen, 1983, 1989)). The theorem of von Neumann asserts convergence inthe Hilbert space L2(X;B; ) in the mean-square sense:kAnf   fk22 = ZX jAnf(x)   f (x)j2 d(x)! 0 ;whereas Birkho's states that for all initial states x, with the possibility of an excep-tional set of measure 0, Anf(x)! f(x) as n!1 .There has been some debate about which of these results should be called \the"Ergodic Theorem (Birkho, 1942a; Birkho, 1942b; Birkho, 1943; von Neumann,1932; von Neumann, 1955b). Birkho's theorem is mathematically deeper and moredelicate. It seems to reect reality in that a scientist in a laboratory is really pre-sented with a sequence of measurements ff(x); f(Tx); : : :g depending on a singleworld history starting from an initial state x; he must deal with this and does nothave the possibility of accessing other possible initial states. On the other hand, vonNeumann argues persuasively (von Neumann, 1932) that it may not be necessaryor reasonable to ask for more than mean square convergence. When quantum ef-fects are taken into account, it is not possible to make a sequence of measurementsff(x); f(Tx); : : :g, since making a measurement perturbs the system in an unpre-dictable way. Because of the Uncertainty Principle, we have even greater problemswhen trying to measure two observables simultaneously (f could be a vector-valuedobservable, too). But by making many measurements, each on a relatively small
6 KARL PETERSENsubsystem of a very large system, we could very well obtain estimates for quantitieslike the probability that Anf is in a certain Borel subset of R or Rd, thereby mak-ing sense out of the (probabilistic) mean-square convergence statement. (See (vonNeumann, 1955a), pp. 299{300 and the surrounding discussion, also pp. 211{214and 221{222.) Perhaps this operational viewpoint is closer to a structural stability ofscientic conclusions|small perturbations or imprecisions are not likely to producelarge qualitative changes|whereas in the pointwise approach a small (whatever thatmight mean) change in the initial state could lead to a vastly dierent developmentof the system. Moreover, von Neumann states (von Neumann, 1932) that estimatesabout the speed of convergence of Anf to its limit can be made, if we somehow haveinformation about the spectral measure ETf . This information can be extremelyhard to come by, and may depend again on applying a convergence theorem, therebyintroducing circularity to the argument. But again it could be the sort of circularitythat can be avoided by controlled repetition, as is often done in physics, where adening or calibrating step sets up measurements based on it. (Thus Newton's sec-ond law F = ma rst denes mass as a constant of proportionality, but afterwards itfunctions as a law, predicting what motions will occur under certain circumstances.)5. Inferring the Structure of a Process from an Individual SamplePathNorbert Wiener, in making key contributions to ergodic theory as well as probabil-ity, seemed to base a sizable chunk of his work on the eort to determine informationabout the structure of a stochastic process (a sequence ff1; f2; : : :g of random vari-ables) from a sample path ff1(x); f2(x); : : :g. Now stationary stochastic processes|the ones whose probability distributions do not change with time|coincide exactlywith the sequences ff; fT; fT 2; : : :g considered above. In an extension of Birkho'stheorem, Wiener and Wigner (1941) showed how to get at the discrete spectrum(the set of eigenvalues of the associated unitary operator) of a stationary stochasticprocess: there is a single set of measure 0 in X outside of whichx() = limn!1 1n nXk=1 e ik f(T kx) exists for all  2 R .Thus there is dened a spectral function x; it is non-zero only for at most count-ably many , namely the elements of the discrete spectrum. For each xed  theexistence of the limit for almost every x is an immediate consequence of Birkho'stheorem; the interest and novelty here is that the uncountably many sets of measure0, one for each , have been combined into a single bad set|still of measure 0!|thatworks simultaneously for all . (The union of countably many sets of measure 0 stillhas measure 0, but the property of having measure 0 need not be preserved underuncountable unions.)
ERGODIC THEOREMS AND THE BASIS OF SCIENCE 7In (Campbell & Petersen, 1989) a relationship was established between the entirespectral measure ET of a measure-preserving transformation T (that is, of its asso-ciated unitary operator) and of another type of ergodic-theoretic limit, the helicaltransform Hf(x) = limn!1 nXk= n0e ik f(T kx)k ,the 0 meaning that the term k = 0 is omitted:1i (Hf  H0f) =  f + [ETf gf + ETf0gf ] + 2ET ( ; 0)f .There a maximal inequality (usually necessary for handling dicult almost every-where convergence results) was proved and the Wiener-Wintner property for thehelical transform was conjectured. Substantial progress for establishing this propertyhas been made by I. Assani and by M. Lacey. This property would permit analysisof a single sample path of a process to obtain detailed information about its entirespectral measure, not just about its point spectrum.In this connection we emphasize one great advantage of the pointwise, or samplepath, approach: we can carry out our computations and deductions without knowinganything about the actual probability  that describes the relative probabilities ofevents. We can even nd out intimate information about the spectral measure ETwithout even knowing the Hilbert space L2(X;B; ) on which it acts. This is doneby breaking the expressions involved up into their real and imaginary parts, theneach of those into their positive and negative parts, and in the limits (in the ergodictheorem or for the helical transform) replacing the limit by a limit superior, whichalways exists for all x, if we allow +1 as a limit. Regardless of , we will almostsurely (with respect to )|that is to say, certainly|get the correct value of the limitfor that part. This provides some justication for the working process of science|stumbling around in the dark, averaging measurements, without any real idea ofwhat we're doing, with no knowledge of the situation that we're actually in, successis nevertheless guaranteed: the average is bound to exist and equal what it should.Here is a kind of stability that does not depend on vagueness.There are other aspects of the global structure of a system that can be determinedby studying typical sample paths: its entropy, by means of the Shannon-McMillan-Breiman Theorem (see (Petersen, 1983, 1989)); the algorithmic complexity of individ-ual orbits (Brudno, 1983; White, 1993); and, for Bernoulli (independent identically-distributed) processes, the entire process itself (Ornstein & Weiss, 1990).6. Time FluctuationsIn the process of measurement, that is, in arriving at the number f(T kx) or f(Ttx),there can be uctuations and errors not only in f , but also in k or in t, since timeitself is measured, or at least somehow counted or kept track of. What happens if
8 KARL PETERSENwe try to take measurements once every 100 ticks of our clock, but lose count nowand then? Or if we try to take measurements, say of the earth's magnetic eld, everymidnight, but actually make small errors with a Gaussian distribution around thosetarget times? It turns out that in the case of discrete time there is wide latitude forerror|the averages will still converge almost surely to the correct value. But in thecase of continuous time, there will always be observable quantities whose averagesdiverge almost everywhere. On the other hand, mean convergence always works.These statements are based on results in (Bergelson et al. , 1994; Bourgain, 1993;Lacey et al. , 1994); we proceed to give a bit more detail.First of all, we emphasize that we are dealing with the same kind of universalityor decoupling that is found in the Wiener-Wintner Theorem. The measurementtimes k(!) and spaces between them k(!) = k(!)   k 1(!) are determined inadvance, and the same sequence of times is then to be used in all laboratories on allexperiments. We assume that we are in an equilibrium situation, so that the spacesbetween measurements form a stationary stochastic process: k(!) = (T k!) for ameasure-preserving transformation T : 
 ! 
 on a probability space (
;F ; P ) andmeasurable function  : 
 ! [0;1). The question is whether or not for all !, withthe possible exception of a set of measure 0, we obtain a sequence of sampling timesk(!) such that if any stationary process is observed at this sequence of times, thenthe resulting sequence of averagesA!ng(y) = 1n nXk=1 g(Sk(!)y)converges for almost every y in a probability space (Y; C; ), whatever the measure-preserving transformation S : Y ! Y and measurable (perhaps also bounded, orintegrable, or p'th-power integrable) function g on Y .First, the positive statement for the discrete-valued case. So long as the spacingfunction  is integrable and has positive nite expectation (mean), we will havealmost everywhere convergence of the averages of these randomly time-perturbedmeasurements, for every bounded measurable g (Lacey et al. , 1994). Possibly theboundedness restriction is removable, but so far we only know that, in case the kare independent and identically distributed with nite second moment and nonzeromean, then we have almost everywhere convergence for each g whose p'th power isintegrable (p > 1). On the other hand, in case the process fkg giving the waitingtimes between measurements has mean 0, there will in every system Y be bounded(even 0,1-valued) observables g whose averages along the sequence of random timeswill diverge almost surely (Bourgain, 1993; Lacey et al. , 1994). Suppose that ourscientist has been making measurements since time immemorial and has listed themin order as f: : : ;m 1;m0;m1;m2; : : :g. We start at position 0 on the list and moveeither one spot forward or backward on the list, depending on whether a sequenceof fair coin tosses that was made and written down previously came up heads or
ERGODIC THEOREMS AND THE BASIS OF SCIENCE 9tails at the corresponding time. We obtain a sequence of numbers fn0; n1; : : : g thatwanders back and forth in the original list. The statement is that quite possiblylimn!1 1n Pnk=1 nk will not exist.In the continuous-time case, if the waiting function  has continuous distributionin some interval, say a sharply peaked normal distribution centered at 1, then thesequence of sampling times that it generates will be bad: for almost every !, inevery nontrivial system Y there will be bounded observables g for which the averagesA!ng(y) diverge for almost every y (Bergelson et al. , 1994).These discrete averages in a continuous-time system are somehow inappropriate|usually in such a case one considers integral averages; this is a second dicultyto pile on top of universality (the attempt to organize uncountably many bad setsof measure 0 into a single set of measure 0). An analogous situation is found insampling a higher-dimensional discrete (Zd) action along a one-dimensional randomwalk. Suppose that we have two commuting measure-preserving transformations S0and S1; this could represent a random eld in (two-dimensional) space, as consideredin statistical mechanics (say random magnetizations, up or down, at each site in acrystal), or perhaps two dierent principles of development that could operate on asystem. At each discrete time instant k = 1; 2; : : : we apply one or the other of thesetransformations, depending on whether heads or tails came up on our previously-observed sequence of coin ips. Again in every nontrivial system there will alwaysbe bounded observables for which the sequence of averages of measurements divergesalmost everywhere. Similarly for any d = 3; 4; : : : .7. Possible Solutions(1) Mean convergence. In all of the situations described above, mean convergence(in L2) continues to hold. So von Neumann's theorem, though cruder than Birkho's,has robustness not only against the diculties caused by quantum theory but alsothose arising from random time uctuations.(2) Subsequences of averages. In case our random process giving the waiting timesbetween measurements takes positive integer values, we are dealing with a subse-quence of the set of times. There is a large literature of positive and negative resultsabout the existence of averages of measurements along subsequences of the integers,including some striking and important recent positive results for the sequences ofsquares and primes; see (Rosenblatt & Wierdl, 1995) for a comprehensive survey.From (Bourgain, 1993; Lacey et al. , 1994) it follows (for fT kg i.i.d.) that providedwe look at the averages A!ng(y) only infrequently, say for n = rr; r = 1; 2; : : : , we willget almost everywhere convergence for higher-dimensional actions (including the caseof T and T 1 being applied according to a sequence of coin ips), even though thefull sequence of averages can diverge. Thus a very careful scientist can analyze thesequence of observations by forming the sequence of averages and discarding most ofthem (provided the time uctuations are i.i.d.).
10 KARL PETERSEN(3) Fewer observables. In any system Y there are many observables g whose aver-ages do converge as they're supposed to, although in the sense of Baire category mostg might be ill-behaved. Conceivably it is only these good functions (which typicallyhave some \smoothness" to them) that are relevant for modeling the real world.(4) Exceptional sets. In the delicate theorems of analysis that treat pointwiseconvergence, usually an exceptional set of measure 0 must be avoided. But how dowe know that our system is not following a history determined by one of these badinitial states? After all, in reality we have only a single world history available, justone point x; how can it be known whether it is good or bad? We are supposed only tohave condence that our model faithfully reects what will occur with overwhelmingprobability|which we take as certainty|when no cheating by rigging up of the initialconditions into peculiar settings is allowed.(5) Multiple averaging. As mentioned above, f(T kx) might actually be not a singlemeasurement, but already an average, or even nearly a limit of averages, \computed"for the experimenter by his measuring devices or process. This pre-averaging canprovide the smoothing discussed in (3). Nonexistence of the rst averages couldaccount for some of the uctuations in our measurements.(6) Quantized time. If time comes in discrete ticks rather than a continuous stream,then it can in principle be measured perfectly precisely. And even if we make randomerrors in counting ticks, so long as our measurement times continue to advance atleast on the average (recall that  only had to havemean 6= 0), we will obtain universalconvergence of averages of all bounded measurements.(7) No decoupling. The universality, in the style of the Wiener-Wintner Theorem,sought for the existence of averages amounted to a decoupling of the process thatdetermines the measurement times from the processes being measured: a randomsequence of times was determined in advance, then the same sequence of times wasused for all measurements in all laboratories. This might be based on the suspicionthat the experimenter is part of a dierent system, and so subject to dierent laws,than the systems he is studying. Perhaps such a decoupling into dierent levels ofreality is impossible|the sequence of random time spacings fkg must be determinedin concert with the performance of the experiment and the readings of measurementsat those times. Parallel experimenters attempting to make measurements at exactlymidnight will each make their own slight time errors, no matter how hard we tryto synchronize their measurements. Thus these abstract mathematical investigationsgive some theoretical support to the parts of relativity and quantum mechanics thatargue the impossibility of enforcing or determining simultaneity or of separating theexperimenter from the system being studied.
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